


# **Standardization -a Means or an Obstacle to Achieve Security?**

Sissel H. Jore

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


Different forms of standardization lie at the backbone of safety management building on the assumptions that it is possible to identify, predict and control the circumstances that produce accidents (Antonsen, Skarholt and Ringstad, 2012).

- In this "world of standards" are there any limits that should be drawn for what to standardize?
- Are there certain types of risks that we might be more reluctant to standardize than other?
- Could standardization actually hamper security instead of foster it?



Assets/ Values



Vulnerabilities

Threats

Nasjonal sikkerhetsmyndighet

Håndbok

Mars 2018

### Risikovurdering for sikring

Risikovurderinger er en viktig del av virksomhetens sikkerhetsstyring.

Håndboken beskriver en metode for gjennomføring av risikovurderinger med fokus på tilsiktede uønskete handlinger (sikring).

Håndboken gir råd til virksomheter om hvordan slike risikovurderinger kan planlegges og gjennomføres.



# Relation between counterterrorism measures and perception of the threat (Jore, 2012)

Counterterrorism measure	Description	Assumption of terrorism
Dialogue, negotiation	Root causes	Political communication
Surveillance, interrogation, arrests	Police	Criminal activity
Security	Reduce vulnerability, emergency management	Manageable risk
Military power	Military	War, national security measures

# The underlying implications of terrorism risk management

- conceptualize terrorism risk as a manageable, predictable and measurable phenomenon and, subsequently, a risk that could be minimized with the right prevention measures
- underpinning assumption that rational decision-making in organizations and society can reduce either the likelihood or the consequences of a terrorist attack
- builds on the notion that the risk should be reduced to an acceptable level and weighted against other values and costs

**-However, is this a logic that fits the risk of terrorism?**



# Terrorism risk management from an organizational perspective

Table 1. Non-exhaustive list of differences between safety and security

	Safety	Security
The nature of the risk	Technical and controllable problem	Human strategic aggressor often rooted in causes outside the organization
Type of intent	Not malicious intent	Intentional, malicious
Types of risk assessment	Quantitative probabilities and frequencies of safety-related risks are often utilized	Qualitative (expert-opinion based) likelihood of security-related risks
Possibility of mitigation	Organization has knowledge about possible risk scenarios and measures	Threats and measures may be symbolic, organizations often lack means




# Security as a non-event with no best management practice

- Security are achieved when unwanted events do not happen
- Security is invisible
- Security is dynamic
- Wicked problem
- No best practice for security risk management



# Is risk analysis a sufficient tool for managing the risk of terrorism?

- The dynamic and secret nature of terrorism implies that it is almost impossible to plan for and envision where terrorists will strike
- “Blame game”
- Standardization is by definition a strategy for dealing with known hazards and scenarios



# *Paradoxes of standardization of security*

- Standards should build security, but could instead lead to more insecurity (more afraid of terrorism)
- Trapping a highly uncertain wicked problem into fixed procedures
- Trapping a political risk into a non-political/neutral perspective
- You cannot measure when security is achieved or what the right level of security is
- Should we standardize phenomena where there don't exist a best practice?



# Why we should have security standards?

- “functional” or “soft” regulation
- Standards will facilitate a hegemonic risk management process across organizations and across different sectors in society
- Facilitate the risk management process
- Lack of security competence



# Standardization of terrorism is not just limited to risk analysis



“We would say that it has gone from hundreds to thousands now. “This is the 'new normal' ... It is an historic challenge that extremist circles are growing,”

Anders Thornberg, Säpo

<https://www.thenational.ae/world/europe/sweden-reports-tenfold-increase-in-isil-sympathisers-1.91695>

## Sweden reports tenfold increase in ISIL sympathisers

'We have never seen anything like it,' says Swedish intelligence chief.

July 3, 2017

Updated: July 3, 2017 08:27 PM

256

shares



A makeshift memorial commemorates the victims of a terror attack near the site where a lorry drove pedestrians near the Ahlens department store in Stockholm, Sweden on April 7, 2014, killing four people and injuring 15. Jonathan Nackstrand / AP / April 14, 2017

Sweden is home to at least 2,000 ISIL sympathisers who are believed to have been radicalised over the internet, the country's spy chief revealed on Monday.

Anders Thornberg, who heads the domestic intelligence agency Säpo, said the number of ISIL loyalists had increased from a suspected 200 in 2010; a 10-fold leap.

"We have never seen anything like it before," Mr Thornberg told the Swedish news agency TT. "We would say that it has gone from hundreds to thousands now."

# Conclusions


- Often terrorist attacks are not directed at a specific organization, but against public spaces and infrastructures. This challenge the logic of risk management because it implies that terrorism risk analysis should not be limited to only one organization. Moreover, the classified nature of security management makes information sharing across organizations difficult. This could hamper both the ability to mitigate against cascading effects, but also in term of bench-marking of what is considered enough security and cross-organization learning
- We need to standardize best practice

# TAKK FOR OPPMERKSOMHETEN!

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**SIKRING/ SECURITY - RISIKOSTYRING OG SIKKERHET I FORHOLD TIL TILSIKTEDE ANGREP - VÅREN 2017**

Kursinformasjon


Prisinformasjon

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10 studiepoeng

Hovedmålet med emnet er å gjøre studentene i stand til å forstå risiko og sikkerhet i forhold til terrorisme og andre tilsiktede uønskede handlinger. Emnet vil legge vekt på å gi studentene en forståelse av terrorisme og kriminelle angrep som fenomen, herunder årsaker, former og sikringstiltak. Studentene skal bli kjent med ulike strategier for forebygging og bekjempelse av tilsiktede uønskede handlinger herunder ulike risikostyringsverktøy og regelverk. Emnet skal også gi innsikt i forhold som påvirker opplevelse av risiko og behovet for beskyttelse.